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Two important commercial states have recently reacted in rather violent
fashion to Section 9-313, the fixture section, of the Uniform Commercial Code.
California refused to adopt Section 9-313 when it enacted the Code,' and
Ohio, after living with Section 9-313 for about a year, decided to revise it
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fessor of Law, University of Michigan, 1964.
*Section 9.313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures.
(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a structure in
the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like and no security
interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure remains personal property
under applicable law. The law of this state other than this Act determines whether and
when other goods become fixtures. This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance
upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures takes
priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an, interest in, the real
estate except as stated in. subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is valid
against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate except as stated in
subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest in the real estate at the
time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing consented to the
security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority
over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by judicial pro-
ceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the extent
that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or the
subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted for without knowl-
edge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A purchaser of the real estate at a
foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a
subsequent purchaser within this section.
(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a secured party has priority over
the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on default, subject
to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral from the real estate but he must re-
imburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and who has
not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminu-
tion in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any
necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission
to remove until the secured party gives adequate security for the performance of this
obligation.
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substantially. 2 Ohio objected most to Section 9-313's rule giving priority to
the fixture secured party over the prior real estate mortgagee, and reversed
it. Thus, under Ohio's replacement of Section 9-313 the prior real estate
mortgagee is invariably favored over the fixture security interest.3 By making
this change, Ohio apparently felt it was returning to its pre-Code law 4 on
the subject as enunciated in Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan
Co.5 Curiously, that case did not even deal with the conflict between the prior
real estate mortgagee and the fixture security interest. In fact, the court ex-
pressly declared that its decision was limited to the rights of persons dealing
with the land subsequent to affixation of the fixture.6 The few Ohio cases
specifically dealing with the conflict between the prior land interest and the
fixture security interest usually followed Section 9-313's approach favoring
the fixture security interest, at least where removal of the fixture could be
accomplished without material injury to the building7 Thus, in rejecting
Section 9-313, Ohio has not really affirmed a long-standing policy or line of
decisions; it would appear, rather, that it has chosen a new, uncharted road.
1. Cal. Laws 1963, ch. 819 (effective Jan. 1, 1965); 1 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT
GuIDE if 5443 (1962).
2. See OHaIo Rav. CODE tit. 13, § 1309.32 (1963), effective Oct. 8, 1963.
3. See OHIO REV. CODE tit. 13, § 1309.32(B) (1963). This, at least, appears to be
the statutory rule. It yet remains to be seen whether the Ohio courts will give full effect
to its language. Other states which had formerly adopted such a rule by judicial decision
often avoided it by declaring what most would think was a "fixture" actually to be "per-
sonalty." See Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1333; 1357
(1963).
There is already Ohio authority to suggest that such an approach is possible. For
example, in Standard Oil Co. v. Zangerle, 144 Ohio St. 523, 60 N.E.2d 59 (1945), it
was conceded that a steam boiler plant which was useable for ordinary manufacturing
businesses would normally be held to be a fixture. However, the court decided that the
particular boiler plant involved was useable only in a particular business and therefore
was to be deemed personalty for tax purposes.
4. "[T]he real estate lien has been restored to its pre-Code positions and the doc-
trine of the Holland Furnace case has been re-established." Hollander, Imperfections in
Perfection of Ohio Fixture Liens, 14 W. Ras. L. REv. 683, 698 (1963). Mr. Hollander's
views are of particular interest since he helped prepare House Bill 248, a bill which was
a precursor of the legislation which repealed § 9-313 in Ohio. H.B. 248 was not adopted
itself, but one of its basic ideas, namely that a fixture security interest should be sub-
ordinate to a prior real estate mortgage, found its way into Amended House Bill 565
which finally passed the Ohio legislature.
5. 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273 (1939).
6. Id. at 57, 19 N.E.2d at 277. The precise holding of the court was that a subse-
quent purchaser of the real estate was not charged with constructive notice of a con-
ditional sales contract on a furnace which had been filed only in the chattel records. Thus,
such a subsequent purchaser without notice took free of the conditional sales contract.
Interestingly, the subsequent purchaser in this case happened to be the prior mortgagee,
who was purchasing at his own foreclosure sale.
7. See Holland Furnace Co. v. joy, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 251 (1934) (furnace); East
Ohio Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Holland Furnace Co., 48 Ohio App. 545 (1934) (furnace) ;
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Katz, 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 595 (1931) (refrigeration system).
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The California response was directed more toward the confusion inherent
in Section 9-313's working procedures than toward the section's policy favoring
the fixture secured party. California felt that Section 9-313 's treatment of fix-
tures would only compound an already confused area of California law.8 The
pre-Code confusion at least had the advantage of familiarity, and apparently
California preferred not to embark on some new road of confusion.
The reactions to Section 9-313 which took place in California and Ohio
confirm that the section is a potential source of trouble.9 Calls for correction
of Section 9-313's shortcomings have been many,' but few have suggested
specifically what can or should be done." If further reactions to Section 9-313
are to be avoided, specific workable solutions to the problems of the section
must be suggested.12
I. How SOUND IS THE POLICY UNDERLYING SECTION 9-313?
The basic policy of Section 9-313 is that fixture financing is desirable. 13
It is to be encouraged by permitting fixture secured parties who follow cer-
tain simple rules to attain priority over all other interests in the land, regard-
less of whether such interests arose prior or subsequent to the affixation of
the fixture.
A. Policy Favoring Fixture Security Interest Over Subsequent Land In-
terest
Allowing a fixture security interest, by an appropriate public filing,' 4 to
achieve priority over persons whose rights in the land arise subsequent to
the installation of the fixture seems to provoke no dissent.' 5 Apparently the
8. The California story is summarized in Project: California Chattel Security and
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 812, 931-42 (1961).
9. The leading article is Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 H.Av. L. Rnv. 1319 (1962).
10. Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARv. L. Rnv. 1333, 1395 (1963).
For a particularly strong attack on § 9-313, see Hollander, supra note 4; and Hollander,
Real Estate and the Commercial Code, 34 CUYAHOGA COUNTY (OHIO) BAR Assoc. J.
(Jan. 1963).
11. Coogan., supra note 9, makes some specific suggestions for minor amendments
both in UCC § 9-313 and the Bankruptcy Act, for the purpose of eliminating certain
bankruptcy problems which now face the fixture secured party. He also makes some broad
suggestions for generally amending § 9-313.
See also Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUm. L. REV.
44 (1964), which was published after this manuscript was prepared. Mr. Kripke does
propose a number of specific changes for UCC § 9-313.
12. The author understands that a Subcommittee of the Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code is now dealing with this problem. Letter from Prof.
Grant Gilmore to author, Sept. 27, 1963.
13. Coogan, supra note 9, at 1319.
14. Filings are usually deemed appropriate only if made in the real estate records.
15. Even Ohio and California agree. See OHaIO Rv. CODE tit. 13, § 1309.32(B)
(1963) ; and Project, supra note 8, at 932, 938. A problem in California, however, is how
the fixture secured party, particularly a conditional vendor, goes about making an
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overwhelming, if not unanimous, view is that an appropriate public filing con-
stitutes constructive notice of the fixture security interest to all persons who
subsequently deal with the land. Such persons then have the free choice of
dealing or not dealing with the land subject to the prior security interest in
the fixture. If they choose to deal with the land, they will be estopped from
later claiming that they made a bad bargain.1 6
B. Policy Favoring Fixture Security Interest Over Prior Land Interest
Until Ohio rejected it, one might have stated that Section 9-313's policy
permitting the fixture security to defeat land interests which arose prior to
the installation of the fixture similarly had won universal acceptance.' 7 Ohio's
action, however, requires that this policy be re-evaluated.
Section 9-313's present approach seems to be based on the notion that the
fixture secured party made possible the addition of new value, namely a fix-
ture, to the land. It is unlikely-probably impossible-that prior land inter-
ests could have relied on this fixture, which was non-existent at the time their
interest was created.' s Thus, it seems only fair that prior real estate interests
be subordinated to the fixture security interest even though real property law
treats an installed fixture as part of the real estate.' 9 However, the prior land
interests did rely on the original condition of the land and fairness dictates
that the fixture secured party should not impair it. Thus, if the fixture secured
party removes the fixture to satisfy his debt, then Section 9-313 requires him
to repair the land to its original condition.2°
These Section 9-313 policies have an obvious equitable appeal. Indeed, the
same equities have long been used to justify the favored position which the
law traditionally accords to any purchase money security interest, of which
the fixture security interest, typically, is an example. 2' The law regards the
purchase money secured party as having a special equity in the new asset
"appropriate" filing; California law apparently has no provisions specifically authorizing
the filing of conditional sales contracts. Id. at 933.
16. See Coogan, supra note 9, at 1331.
17. As recently as May 1963, Professor Gilmore assumed that the policy of § 9-313
respecting priorities both to prior and subsequent real estate interests would not be ques-
tioned. Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1396 n.134.
18. The conflict between the prior construction mortgage and fixture security interest
is a special case of this general problem. It differs from the more general problem in that
the construction mortgagee does in fact rely on the future fixtures in making his advances.
Because of the different considerations involved, it is beyond the scope of this discussion.
However, see discussion by Kripke, supra note 11, at 71. Notwithstanding the somewhat
different considerations involved, the writer agrees with Mr. Kripke's statement that the
Code's general policies should not be refined in favor of construction lenders who "can
protect themselves by searches before each advance. . . ." Id. at 71.
19. Cf. UCC § 9-313, Comment 4.
20. UCC § 9-313(5).
21. The development of the priority accorded to purchase money security interest
and the place therein of the fixture security interest is set out lucidly by Gilmore, supra
note 10.
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which his funds made possible, an equity sufficient to override any claims of
prior parties to the same new asset. But even if one were willing to ignore
these equities and consider the problem from a strictly commercial view-
point,22 the basic Section 9-313 policy favoring the fixture secured party does
more to encourage building and plant renovation than does Ohio's present
statutory approach favoring the prior real estate mortgagee.
One might consider first an economy of rising real estate values such as the
United States experienced for many years following World War II. In such
an economy , the prior real estate mortgagee (unless he has been completely
reckless in his loans) has an ample and increasing cushion to assure the re-
payment of his debt, by reason of the continuing inflation in land values. Con-
flicts between fixture security interest and land mortgagee are unlikely since
the building and fixture in combination have, or in the future will have, suffi-
cient value to take care of both debts.23 However, different considerations
apply in a period of falling real estate values. Here, the cushion of value in
the land and its improvements which protect the real estate mortgagee is con-
stantly diminishing. In time, it will reach zero and, indeed, may become a
negative quantity. This will be true even in a period of stable real estate
values. For then there is a slow yet constant depreciation in improved real
estate merely because of the passage of time.
Thus, where the period is one either of stable or declining real estate values,
potential exists for conflict between the real estate mortgagee and the fixture
secured party. In both situations the total land value constantly moves toward
a point where it will be insufficient to take care of both claims. Under such
conditions, the mortgagee will, understandably, be anxious to shore up the
diminishing value of his mortgage lien by including within its scope the new
value added to the land by a fixture. In so doing, the mortgagee must collide
with the fixture secured party, whose only collateral is the very same fixture.
If, in this collision, an Ohio-type rule invariably favoring the real estate
mortgagee is applied, the incentive to finance plant and building improve-
ment through the addition of new fixtures may be diminished to such an ex-
tent that the commercial need for such improvements will be frustrated.2 4
22. UCC § 1-102(2) seems to require that the Commercial Code be interpreted in
light of moder commercial needs.
23. In fact, in, an economy of rising real estate values, it probably makes little dif-
ference what priority rule is adopted to resolve the conflict between real estate mortgagees
and fixture security interests. Simply stated, there is unlikely to be any conflict between
them since the rising land value and generally vigorous economy assures ultimate pay-
ment to both. Is this the answer to Professor Gilmore's query why there has been no
significant amount of litigation on this subject since 1940? See Gilmore, supra note 10
at 1363.
24. At least one Ohio writer recognized this as far back as 1939. Mr. Loren Souers
then wrote:
Public policy requires that improvements on property be encouraged, and con-
ditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages have satisfied this requirement by
extending credit to purchasers. But the rule of . . . [Holland Furnace Co. v.
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It should be noted, moreover, that Section 9-313's policy, even though giv-
ing supremacy to the fixture security interest, also benefits the real estate
mortgagee since he inevitably obtains at least a second lien on every fixture
which is installed in the building.25 From the real estate mortgagee's point of
view, this second lien is a windfall; he neither expected nor relied upon it
when originally advancing his funds.2 6 Yet, this windfall second lien becomes
more valuable to the real estate mortgagee with each payment to the fixture
secured party. Upon final payment of the fixture security interest, the land
mortgagee's second lien actually becomes a first lien. Since the typical real
estate mortgage runs for a much longer term than the typical fixture security
interest, Section 9-313's approach has the long term effect of feeding new value
to the prior real estate mortgagee's collateral-new value he had neither an-
ticipated or relied upon in making his loan.
It would appear, then, that the underlying policy of Section 9-313, giving
priority to the fixture security interest over both prior and subsequent land
interests, is consonant with concepts of fairness and with sound commercial
practice.2 7 Thus, it seems clear that the problems of Section 9-313 do not
stem from its basic policy. Rather, the source of difficulty is the statutory
machinery used to implement that policy.28 The question which must be an-
swered is, how can this machinery be improved?
Trumbull Say. & Loan Co. (discussed supra in text at note 6)] leaves the status
of such contracts sufficiently in doubt that such extension of credit in the future
will be necessarily curtailed until some later clarification by the Supreme Court
occurs.
14 Ohio Op. 164, 167.
The prior real estate mortgagee might be willing to finance new fixtures if his pre-
vious advances are substantially less than the value of the real estate. However, in this
kind of case, no conflict is likely between the real estate mortgagee and fixture secured
party because of the ample value cushion in the land. Thus, a priority rule to settle the
conflict between them is unimportant and would be neutral in encouraging or discourag-
ing building and plant renovation.
Where the real estate mortgagee has previously advanced funds to the full value of
the land only to see his value cushion in the land being chipped away with passage of
time, he is unlikely to have much enthusiasm for advancing further funds to finance the
addition of new fixtures to the building. Rather, the real estate mortgagee is likely to
look upon this building-one which may not even be sufficient to recoup his previous
advances-as a losing proposition. Thus, from the real estate mortgagee's point of view,
advancing any further funds for this building may look like throwing good money after
bad. Yet, it is precisely this situation where fixture installation is most needed to renovate
the building and, in the case of a commercial structure, to improve the earning potential
of the debtor.
25. Fixtures become part of the real estate and, thus, "... as 'accessions' come
automatically under the lien of the mortgage." Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1350.
26. See discussion by Coogan & Clovis, The U.C.C. and Real Estate Law, 38 IND.
LJ. 535, 570 (1963).
27. See text accompanying notes 20-26 sP ra.
28. This accords with Professor Gilmore's assumption mentioned stpra note 17.
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II. A NEw APPROACH TO FIXTURE FINANCING
A. The Language Problem of Section 9-313: Can a Fixture Be Defined?
Many have urged a clear-cut statutory definition of a fixture as the solution
to the bulk of Section 9-313's troubles.29 This outcry is understandable, since
the entire workings of Section 9-313-priority rules, place of filing, etc.- de-
pend upon an initial determination that a fixture is involved. And nowhere
does the Commercial Code set out clear guides for making that determina-
tion.
Even worse, Section 9-313(1) leaves the determination of when a chattel
becomes a fixture to the individual states, which never had been particularly
successful in developing consistent and workable rules on the subject.80 In-
deed, it has been suggested that there may not even be pre-Code rules which
deal with the problem in some states. 1 With each state free under Section
9-313 to make its own determination of what is a fixture, an unfortunate
situation has been created in what is supposed to be a uniform commercial
code. Obviously any uniform law must allow for occasional variation to meet
local needs. However, it is hard to imagine just what local need is sufficiently
weighty to overcome a commercial need for a uniform policy dealing with
fixture financing which now has nationwide implications.32 Thus, if nothing
else is done to improve Section 9-313, its local determination rule as to when
goods become fixtures ought to be eliminated - and this should be done even
though no statutory definition for a fixture is worked out to replace it. At
least with Section 9-313 completely silent on the definition of a fixture, the
29. See Braucher, The Uniform Commercial Code-A Third Look, 14 W. REs. L.
Rav. 7, 21 (1962) ; Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1395; Coogan, supra note 9, at 1344. See
also Coogan & Clovis, supra note 26, at 569. Cf. Kripke, supra note 11, at 62-63.
30. See Coogan, supra note 9, at 1347 and authorities cited therein; and Coogan &
Clovis, supra note 26, at 557.
31. Coogan, supra note 9, at 1346, suggests that Massachusetts and Ohio were in this
category. The Ohio situation, is also discussed by Bums, Some Specific Problems Raised
by Article 9 in Ohio, 14 W. Ras. L. Ray. 56, 65 (1962), and Hollander, supra note 4, at
685. These gentlemen conclude that pre-Code Ohio and Massachusetts law recognized
only two classes of property: personal property which was removable, and fixtures which
became a part of the real estate and thus were not removable. But no intermediate cate-
gory in the nature of a removable fixture such as contemplated by § 9-313 was recognized.
Even assuming arguendo that these gentlemen have stated the pre-Code Ohio and Mass-
achusetts law correctly, does it follow as they seem to fear that lawyers in these states
have no guidelines for applying § 9-313? Section 9-313(1) merely turns to non-Code law
to determine when goods become fixtures, and apparently, even Massachusetts and Ohio
have law on this subject. The right to remove the fixture comes expressly from § 9-313(5)
itself whether or not that right also existed before the Code.
In a later article, Coogan & Clovis, supra note 26, at 556-73, review this entire
problem and make valuable suggestions for dealing with it.
32. See Kripke, supra note 11, at 63, where he describes the nationwide financing




courts would then be required by Section 1-102(1) (c) to develop case law
which, in time, probably would result in some uniform ideas on the subject."8
However, the law's experience indicates that defining a fixture, whether by
judicial decision or statute, is difficult, and perhaps impossible. 4 Therefore,
what may be needed is an entirely new approach to the fixture financing
problem: an approach which accomplishes the objectives and policies of pres-
ent Section 9-313, yet does so without being tied to the definition of a fixture
for its success.3 5
B. A New Approach to the Problem of Financing Fixtures
The present approach of Section 9-313 requires that the financier first make
a decision whether the new collateral is chattel or fixture. If the decision is
chattel, then purchase money security interest rules for chattels are followed.
If the decision is fixture, then Section 9-313's fixture rules apply. Yet the
basic policies governing the financing of fixtures and the financing of new
chattels are substantially the same: both are but different aspects of the
broader problem of financing any new collateral obtained by a debtor. Why,
then, do the Code's specific working rules (i.e., place of filing, priority, etc.)
applicable to chattels and fixtures differ? 3( These differences are not only in-
explicable; they also have caused all the grief. Since there is no satisfactory
guide for drawing the line between chattel and fixture, the result is confusion
as to which set of rules to apply. Different persons are likely to reach dif-
ferent conclusions under the same facts.37 Conflict is inevitable.
Since the policies underlying the financing of new chattels or new fixtures
coincide, why not seek to devise working rules for financing both types of col-
lateral which are precisely the same? In such an integrated, unified system,
the determination of the dividing line between chattel and fixture, presently
required by Section 9-313, would become unimportant; at most, it would be
an academic problem but not a practical one. Regardless of whether the col-
lateral is chattel or fixture, the end result as to where one files and as to
priorities vis-a-vis other interests would always be the same. Thus, the possi-
bility of conflict is eliminated.
Such an ideal system is more than a theoretical idea. Indeed, it can be sub-
stantially achieved with relatively minor changes in the present Commercial
Code. Suggestions for the specific statutory changes needed are set forth in
the Appendix. A discussion of them follows.
33. The courts are required to interpret the Commercial Code to promote uniformity
among the various jurisdictions. UCC § 1-102(2) (c).
34. Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1396; Coogan, supra note 9, at 1347.
35. Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1396, envisioned this possibility. Indeed, it is his state-
ment which inspired this paper.
36. Gilmore also noted this inconsistency. See Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1400.
37. For example, a real estate mortgagee may find it momentarily advantageous to
argue that certain collateral is a chattel rather than, a fixture. Likewise a chattel mort-
gagee may occasionally find it worthwhile to argue that the collateral is a fixture, See
Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1392.
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C. Integration of Filing Rules
The most obvious difference between the Code's present working rules for
chattel and fixture financing involves the place of filing the financing state-
ment. The chattel financing statement is filed in the chattel records; the fix-
ture financing statement is filed in the real estate records.3 8
This distinction could be eliminated by discarding the present requirement
that fixture filings be placed in the real estate records and requiring, instead,
that they be placed in the chattel records. Then all financing statements
(whether referring to chattel or fixture) would be found in the same place.
However, this would unduly burden land title searchers who expect and
should be able to find in the real estate records information respecting any
encumbrance, including fixture security interests, affecting land.
A second possibility for integrating the filing rules would be to eliminate
the present requirement that chattel filings be placed in separate chattel records
and to require, instead, that all chattel filings be placed only in the real estate
records. Again, this would centralize all chattel and fixture filings. But this
possibility too must be rejected since it would clutter the real estate records
with a jumble of information, most of which would have no connection what-
soever with real estate titles. For similar reasons, a third possibility requiring
all filings to be made both in the chattel and real estate records must be re-
jected.
The workable solution for integrating the fixture and purchase money chat-
tel filing rules is to require fixture financing statements to be filed in dupli-
cate: in the land records, as now required, and also in the chattel records. 30
For the benefit of real estate title searchers, the requirement of duplicate
filings should not change the present law requiring the fixture financing state-
ment to contain a description of the real estate where the fixture is installed.40
The real estate description, however, will in no way affect the efficacy of the
filing when placed in the chattel records. The financing statement still will
contain the minimum necessary information required for chattel filings. 41 It
will contain some additional information (the real estate description) beyond
the minimum required, but this surplusage will not impair its effectiveness as
38. UCC § 9-401.
39. See appendix for proposed revision of § 9-401(1). In states that have adopted
the third alternative to subsection (1) of 9-401, three filings may actually be required in
some cases to accomplish "duplicate" filings required by this proposal. This arises from
the fact that the third alternative already requires two filings (one locally and one cen-
trally) in some pure chattel cases. Most often this happens where business collateral
owned by a debtor having a single place of business is involved. By way of example, if
a furnace were installed in a commercial office building owned by a debtor having only
a single place of business, then an effective chattel filing would require filing both with
the Secretary of State and the local clerk or recorder. To obtain the "duplicate" filing
required by this proposal, still a third filing would be needed in the office where real
estate mortgages are kept.
40. UCC § 9-402 provides for such a description.
41, See UCC § 9-402.
[Vol. 73 : 788
FIXTURE SECURITY INTERESTS
a chattel filing. Thus, even though a court might hold ultimately that the
collateral involved was a chattel, no harm would have been done. On the
other hand, if a court holds the collateral was a fixture, then there equally
has been a proper fixture filing containing the required real estate descrip-
tion. Thus, by filing doubly, the secured party has complete protection and
is assured that he has filed correctly regardless of whether the collateral is
ultimately held to be fixture or chattel. Similarly, any searcher of the records
is put on notice of the outstanding security interest in the collateral and has
no basis to argue that the filing was improper.
Quite likely, the initial reaction to this proposal is that it is a bootstrap
operation which accomplishes nothing. The proposal requires only that fixture
filings be made in duplicate. Pure chattel filings would be sufficient if filed
singly in the chattel records. Thus, it might appear that this duplicate filing
proposal still requires one to make an initial determination whether the col-
lateral is chattel or fixture-the very determination which the proposal sought
to eliminate.
Such an objection, however, presents no real obstacle when the proposal is
viewed in its practical context. Under this duplicate filing rule, the practitioner
really need not decide (or more likely, guess) whether a chattel or fixture is
involved. All that is required is that he be aware that there is a question as
to which is involved. Recognizing that such a question exists is far easier
than reaching the firm decision presently required by Section 9-313 as to where
one draws the dividing line between chattel and fixture. Consider, for ex-
ample, the problem of a built-in gas oven, the gas lines and exhaust pipes of
which are imbedded in the walls. Few practitioners would dare state definitely
whether the oven with its gas lines and exhaust pipes will be held to be chat-
tel, fixture, or some of both. But they would not have much difficulty in realiz-
ing that there is a question as to whether a chattel or fixture is involved.
Once there is awareness that a question exists, the practitioner may file in
duplicate and be assured of complete protection, since his double filing satis-
fies both the chattel and fixture filing requirements. Indeed, any official com-
ments accompanying this proposal should point out the desirability of dupli-
cate filings with respect to any collateral where there exists the slightest
doubt whether it is fixture or chattel.42 Undoubtedly, even under present
Section 9-313, careful secured parties already are filing in duplicate in these
borderline situations.43 That which careful persons are already doing for the
purpose of reducing the potential for conflict now inherent in present Section
9-313 ought to be incorporated into the actual structure of that section.
It should be emphasized that this proposal reverses the Code's present rule
permitting fixture filings to be effective if made singly in the real estate records.
Where a fixture is involved, duplicate filings--once in the chattel records and
42. This has already been done in similar situations. See, e.g., UCC § 9-103, Official
Comment 2.
43. Coogan, supra note 9, at 1341-42 has encouraged the practice. Undoubtedly, this
same advice has been repeated by many others.
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also in the land records-would be essential to accomplish perfection. But the
double filing required in the fixture situation happily also meets the filing
requirements for a chattel if a court later declares the collateral to be chattel.
Thus, by filing doubly, the financier completely avoids even the possibility of
attack on the ground that his filing may have been erroneous. Under this
proposal, the only single filing which could be effective is one made in the
chattel records provided that a court later agrees that the collateral was, in
fact, a chattel. Thus, the necessary effect of this proposal is to subject any
security interest which is filed singly in the chattel records to attack on the
ground that it was a fixture and therefore required a double filing. As such,
the motive is strong for the financier to eliminate this possibility for attack
on his security interest by filing doubly in any case where there is the slightest
possibility that a court might later declare the collateral a fixture. It is this
strong motive to file doubly in those doubtful cases and thereby obtain com-
plete filing protection which assures that this proposal is workable in prac-
tical day to day operations.
The simple step of requiring duplicate filing for fixture security interests,
which in turn motivates duplicate filing whenever the nature of the collateral
is in doubt, would thus go a long way to reduce many problems now existing
by reason of Section 9-313. By and large, it would eliminate the confu-
sion and conflict which now arise under Section 9-313 by reason of a search
in the wrong set of records because the financier guessed that the collateral
was fixture whereas the searcher guessed that the collateral was a chattel. As
a practical matter, regardless of whether the chattel or land records were
searched, an outstanding security interest in a particular item of collateral
would likely be discovered. The searcher would be made aware that the
collateral, be it chattel or fixture, could be dealt with only subject to the
outstanding prior security interest. In fact, under the proposal only one possi-
bility exists for conflict because the searcher checks the wrong records; namely
if the financier, satisfied that the collateral is pure chattel, files only in the
chattel records, while the searcher, believing the item to be a fixture, examines
only the real estate records. For this situation to arise in a practical context,
the financier must be so certain that the collateral is pure chattel that he feels
no need for a protective double filing; and the searcher must be equally cer-
tain that the collateral is fixture, to the degree that he sees no need even to
check the chattel records. Just what collateral might raise such diametrically
opposite certainties among practical businessmen or lawyers is, indeed, diffi-
cult to imagine.
D. Integration of the Priority Rules
Requiring fixture security interest filings to be duplicated in the chattel
records would be a long step toward a workable integrated financing system
wherein the distinction for financing purposes between chattel and fixture is
eliminated. However, by itself, it still falls short of that goal, as illustrated by
the following example.
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X loans money to the Widgett Manufacturing Company. To secure its loan,
X obtains and promptly perfects both a real estate mortgage on Widgett's
real estate and a security interest in all of Widgett's present and after-acquired
personal property. Thereafter, Widgett Manufacturing Company realizes that
its operations require more hot water. Accordingly, Widgett orders from F a
new hot water tank. The tank is then installed by F. After its installation, F
and Widgett execute a security agreement plus several financing statements
containing a description of the real estate where the tank is installed to cover
the purchase price. The financing statements are then promptly filed in both
the chattel and real estate records.
It will be noted that F has abided by the above proposal to file financing
statements in duplicate wherever doubt exists whether the collateral-the hot
water tank-will ultimately be held to be chattel or fixture. Even so, because
the Commercial Code's present priority rules are different for chattels than
they are for fixtures, the priority contest between X and F as to the hot water
tank still will depend entirely on whether the hot water tank is held to be a
fixture or a chattel. If held to be a chattel, F will prevail as the holder of a
purchase money security interest which was perfected within ten days after
Widgett obtained possession thereof. 44 If held to be a fixture, X will prevail
as a prior real estate mortgagee who defeats any fixture security interest
which arose after installation of the fixture.4 5
Many other examples could be presented.46 Each would point to the fact
that an integrated system which eliminates or minimizes the distinction be-
tween fixture financing and purchase money chattel financing must have com-
mon priority rules as well as common filing rules.
To achieve this objective, it is probably best to revise the present fixture
priority rules to make them coincide with the corresponding purchase money
chattel rules. Presently, the chattel rules permit the purchase money security
interest to prevail over any prior or subsequent interest in the chattel if per-
fection is accomplished within ten days after the debtor obtains possession of
the chattels. 47 Accordingly, Section 9-313 should be amended to require a
similar ten day filing for the fixture security interest to obtain protection
against all prior and subsequent land claimants. 48 Further, to assure consist-
44. UCC § 9-312 (4).
45. UCC § 9-313(3).
46. See Coogan, supra note 9, at 1330.
47. UCC §§ 9-301(1-2) give the purchase money chattel interest priority over pur-
chasers, transferors, and lien creditors. UCC § 9-312(4) gives priority over other secured
parties. Slightly different rules govern where purchase money security interests in in-
ventory collateral are involved. See UCC § 9-312(5), which requires notice phs im-
mediate filing to defeat other security interests in iaventory collateral. See also UCC
§ 9-307, where a buyer in ordinary course of inventory collateral can defeat a security
interest therein. However, it is hard to imagine a situation where fixtures might ever be
looked upon as inventory. As such, it is assumed that integrating the fixture rules with
non-inventory purchase money chattel rules is all that is practically required to achieve
the underlying objectives of the proposals set forth in this article.
48. See appendix for proposed revision of § 9-313(2).
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ency, Section 9-313 must also make clear that this supremacy is reserved only
for a purchase money fixture security interest as opposed to a non-purchase
money fixture security interest which, by chance, happened to have been per-
fected within the ten day period.49
In the chattel situation, there is one exception to the supremacy accorded
to the purchase money security, interest filed within a ten day period. That
exception is in favor of a bona fide purchaser of the chattel who purchases
the chattel before actual perfection of the security interest, even though with-
in the ten day grace period normally allowed for perfection.5 0 Accordingly, a
similar exception in favor of bona fide purchasers of the land should be writ-
ten into Section 9-313 with respect to the fixture security interest.51
These changes would little affect the present Section 9-313 result with
respect to persons obtaining interests in the land subsequent to the installation
of the fixture. 52 Among such persons, only the judgment lien creditor would
have his rights affected, and then only slightly. Under present Section 9-313,
such a subsequent lien creditor has priority so long as his lien was obtained
at any time prior to perfection; under the proposed change, the lien creditor
would be defeated by a fixture security interest which was filed within the
ten day grace period.
On the other hand, these changes in the fixture priority rules would very
markedly affect Section 9-313's approach respecting claimants whose interest
in the land arose prior to the installation of the fixture. Presently, the ques-
tion whether the prior land claimant defeats the fixture security interest de-
pends entirely upon the timing of the attachment of security interest. The time
of filing the security interest plays no part whatsoever in this determination.
So long as the fixture security interest attaches before installation of the fix-
ture, it invariably, defeats prior land interests.5 3 On the other hand, if the
security interest attaches after installation of the fixture, it never defeats prior
land interests. 54 These priority rules are based on the notion that prior land
interests can never be prejudiced by a non-filing.. The assumption is that
prior land interests could not have relied on a fixture which is later installed.
Thus, the theory is that the fact of filing or non-filing of the fixture security
interest is of no significance with respect to their claims.55
49. Ibid. In the overwhelming number of cases, fixture financiers will also be pur-
chase money financiers. See Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1389. However, fixtures may be
a source of collateral to persons not involved in financing its acquisition.. Thus, it should
be made clear that such persons are not entitled to the priorities peculiar to the purchase
money security interest.
50. UCC § 9-301(1) (c) and (2).
51. See appendix for proposed revision of § 9-313(2). The proposal also makes it
clear that a prior mortgagee who subsequently gives new value is to be deemed a pur-
chaser.
52. See proposed revision of § 9-313(3) in appendix.
53. UCC § 9-313 (2).
54. UCC § 9-313(3).
55. UCC § 9-313, Official Comment 4.
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As a realistic m'atter, however, there certainly are sore' situati6ns 'where
prior land interests do rely on fixtures which are later installed. Quite true,
there is no reliance on the nonexistent fixture when' the prior land interest
extends his creditY6 But prior land interests may rely on the fixture at a
later time, particularly when deciding whether to institute foreclosure pro-
ceedings.57 Certainly many real estate mortgagees have withheld foreclosure
proceedings on the assumption that the additional value imparted to the land
by a subsequently installed fixture is now subject to his mortgage lien. Yet
such apparently justifiable assumptions may be frustrated because of Section
9-313's rule that no public notice (filing) of a fixture security interest is
necessary to defeat a prior land interest. This could be avoided, in most in-
stances, by requiring the fixture security interest to be filed within ten days
to assure his supremacy over prior land interest.
Moreover, it is difficult to follow the logic of present Section 9-313's ap-
proach where a security interest which attaches before installation always de-
feats the prior land interests while a fixture security interest which attaches
after installation never defeats them. The party affected, namely the prior
land interest, rarely knows-indeed he probably has no way of knowing-the
precise time when the fixture security interest attached.58 Realistically, the
prior land interest is aware only of one fact: whether the fixture is or'is not
installed on the land. If it is there on the land, the prior land interest is likely
to rely on it in his future actions unless he is forewarned that the fixture is
subject to another person's paramount security interest. The time of attach-
ment of the fixture security interest, being a matter entirely beyond the prior
land interest's knowledge, hardly can be expected to govern his future ac-
tions5 0 Therefore, a requirement that fixture security interests be filed within
ten days to defeat prior land claimants will result not only in common
priority rules for fixtures and chattels, but also will remedy the inequity now
arising from Section 9-313's emphasis on time of attachment.
Another rather difficult problem remains in integrating the priority rules
with respect to bona fide purchasers. The Commercial Code's present chattel
rules permit the good faith purchaser for value to defeat the unperfected pur-
chase money chattel security interest only if he also receives delivery of the
chattel before perfection.6 0 If common fixture and chattel rules are to be
achieved, at first glance it might seem that some similar delivery requirement
should be inserted in the fixture priority sections.
56. This is not so when a construction mortgage is involved. With reference to the
special situation involving the construction, mortgage, see supra note 19.
57. Coogarr, supra note 9, at 1333, also noted this fact.
58. Attachment of a security interest occurs wher the last of the following takes
place, although they need not occur in any particular order: (1) agreement to give the
security interest, (2) value extended by the secured party, and (3) the debtor obtaining
rights in the collateral. See UCC § 9-204(1).
59. Hollander, supra note 10, at 688, also noted this problem.
60. UCC § 9-301 (1) (c). See also UCC § 9-301, Offidal Comment 4.
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
One readily grasps the idea of a "delivery" when dealing with chattels.
However, the concept is elusive in the land situation. Does it entail delivery
to the purchaser of physical possession of the land? Or would it suffice if
there were merely delivery to the purchaser of the deed required under real
property law in most real estate title transactions? Rather than seek an an-
swer to these questions, perhaps a more desirable solution is to eliminate the
"delivery" requirement entirely-in both the chattel and the fixture situation.6 1
Why should not a purchaser, whether of goods or land with fixtures in-
stalled, be fully protected merely on the basis that he gave value in good
faith and without actual or constructive notice of an unperfected security in-
terest? To impose on such a good faith purchaser the further requirement
that he also obtain delivery gives an unwarranted advantage to the secured
party. The secured party, by perfecting promptly and thereby giving con-
structive notice of his security interest, could have fully protected himself
and likely avoided loss to the purchaser. Where the secured party fails to do
this, it does not seem that he should be able to defeat a purchaser, who gives
value in good faith and relies on the apparently unencumbered status of the
property, merely because the purchaser has not received delivery of the prop-
erty as well.
The purchaser's failure to receive delivery of the property, of course, may
have legal consequences beyond Article 9 of the Commercial Code. It may
give rights to the seller's creditors under the law of fraudulent transfers.62
Or, it might work an estoppel against the purchaser in favor of persons who
may have relied on the seller's continued possession.6 However, absent facts
showing such an estoppel or fraud, no justifiable reason exists for making a
bona fide purchaser's rights to either chattels or land dependent on delivery
in order to defeat an unprotected security interest therein.
E. The New Approach Applied to Financing Structural Materials
Students of Section 9-313 realize that the line between chattel and fixture
is not the only one which it is necessary to draw. The section also necessitates
a distinction between chattel and structure. Putting it more precisely, Section
9-313(1) makes it clear that Commercial Code security interests are not even
available with respect to goods which become a part of a structure such as
cement, bricks, etc. Any lien rights desired for the financing of such goods
must, instead, be acquired under real property law-most likely as a real
estate mortgage or a real estate mechanics lien.
Although it may be easier to determine when chattels become a part of the
structure than when chattels become fixtures, many cases can be suggested
61. See appendix for proposed revision of § 9-301 (1) (c).
62. Where a buyer permits his seller to retain possession of the sold property, then
the sale may be deemed a fraudulent transfer. See WIL.ISTON, SALES § 351 passim
(rev. ed. 1948). Cf. UCC § 2-402.
63. See 19 Am. JUR. Estoppel, § 68, at 696 (1938); see also WILLISTON, SALES
§ 349 (rev. ed. 1948) ; cf. UCC § 2-403.
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where the precise placement of this chattel-structure line will present diffi-
culty.64 By way of example, does paneling tacked to a wall retain its charac-
teristics as chattel or does it become incorporated into the structure? In-
deed, what constitutes a structure even may be unclear. For instance, is a
fence or a telephone pole a structure?
Under present Section 9-313, one first must determine what constitutes
a structure and then determine whether the chattel in question has been in-
corporated therein in order to resolve finally whether an Article 9 security
interest in such collateral is possible. To avoid these obvious problems, it
seems advisable to apply the new approach suggested for financing fixtures
also to those goods which become part of the structure-to treat such goods
precisely as if they were fixtures, and to allow the purchase money financier
to obtain security interests under the Code by complying with the integrated
filing requirements and priority rules suggested above.65 If this were done, the
end result would be a unified system for the purchase money financing of all
goods. So long as the collateral starts out as chattel, then the financier, by
using the system, would be certain of obtaining his purchase money priority
with respect to the goods regardless of any future determination as to whether
the goods (1) retain their characteristics as pure chattels, or (2) are so affixed
to the real estate as to become fixtures, or (3) are so incorporated in the real
estate as to become part of a structure. Similarly, third parties would be
spared the difficulty of drawing these lines since the working rules of the
system affecting them (filing, priority, etc.) dictate the same results regard-
less of which of the three categories is involved.
This proposal, of course, would not prevent financiers from obtaining liens
and mortgages by traditional real property law methods because of the addi-
tion of structural goods. The proposal merely adds an additional mechanism
for financing this kind of collateral. But, with the inclusion of this mechanism,
a completely integrated system for the purchase money financing of any col-
lateral which begins life as chattel can be achieved. Hopefully, such an in-
tegrated financing system would end the difficult problems now raised by the
necessity of drawing lines between chattel, fixture, and structure.
III. SOME CLARIFICATION NEEDED IN SECTION 9-313
Problems other than those raised by the necessity of drawing a line be-
tween fixture and chattel also need clarification and change in Section 9-313. 651
Although the suggestions for clarification of Section 9-313 which follow would
64. Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1390, says that no statutory formula could ever be
devised to place this line. Interestingly, he goes on to state that under present § 9-313
there is no practical necessity to do so.
65. See appendb for proposed revision of § 9-313(1). Obviously a secured party with
a security interest in structural materials should be prohibited from removing them as a
foreclosure device. See discussion in!ra, Part III.
65a. See Kripke, supra note 11.
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complement nicely the above proposal for an integrated financing system, the
question of their desirability stands independently of that proposal.
A. Judicial Foreclosure in Lieu of Removal of Fixtures and Structural
Materials
Where the fixture secured debt is not paid, removal of the fixture seems
to be the favorite means of foreclosing on the fixture security interest. Indeed,
from the literature, one might get the impression that it is the only foreclosure
method now authorized by Section 9-313.66 However, if the fixture secured
party's interest is junior to some other interest in the real estate, he has no
right to remove the fixture under present Section 9-313(5). And in many in-
stances, the fixture secured party may prefer not to exercise his removal rights.
This will occur often where the fixture has little or no value apart from the
building in which it was installed. An example might be an elevator designed
for a particular building. Dismantled from the building, the elevator probably
has only junk value. On the other hand, the union of building and fixture
make for a useful and economically valuable whole. Indeed, in most situa-
tions, the combination (fixture plus building) is worth more than the sum
of the individual components.
Where the fixture secured party has no right of removal or, having the
right, prefers not to exercise it, the Code, as it now stands, probably authorizes
the fixture secured party to employ judicial foreclosure proceedings to enforce
his security interest.67 However, this result is not clear, and the right to resort
to judicial foreclosure ought not to be left to doubt. Clarifying amendments
to Section 9-313 or its official commentary are obviously needed.68
But the problem cuts deeper and will not be solved entirely by an amend-
ment merely making it clear that judicial foreclosure of a fixture is an optional
alternative to foreclosure by removal. There are situations where a fixture
secured party should actually be required to use judicial foreclosure proceed-
ings even though he has the right of removal and wishes to exercise that right.
An example might be where a secured party, having a paramount security
interest in a heating system in a large apartment building, sought to remove
it during the dead of winter. The injurious effect of such action on the tenants
66. See, e.g., Gilmore, mpra note 10, at 1391 where he states that " .. as a practical
matter the only goods as to which the 9-313 priority is worth having are goods which
can be removed without seriously damaging the structure." See also Coogan & Clovis,
supra note 26, at 56, where the authors emphasize removeability as the major attribute
of a fixture.
67. UCC §§9-501(1), 1-106(2). Undoubtedly these would be equitable proceedings
where the court would have broad powers to fashion a decree to meet the peculiar
circumstances of the case. Thus, the court might turn to receivership to collect rents and
profits which would then be applied on the security interest. Or, in appropriate cases,
it might even order a sale of the land subject to senior interests. Compare Coogan, supra
note 9, at 1327, who states that a junior secured party has no effective foreclosure rights
except by consent of the senior land interests.
68. See proposed revision, of § 9-313(5) in appendix.
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of the apartment building is obvious. Common sense, therefore, suggests that
some limitations be placed on the absolute right of a prior fixture security
interest to remove. At least, judicial foreclosure should be required where
removal would adversely affect health or safety. If not provided for in Sec-
tion 9-313, the limitation is one likely to be imposed by the courts through
some "back door" means.69
Such judicial prohibition on removal probably should also be authorized
where removal would cause irreparable harm to the rights of other persons
having interests in the land; or where the economic value of such other in-
terests would be disproportionately diminished by the removal. A fairly clear
example would be the attempted removal of structural materials by a secured
party claiming a paramount security interest therein under the proposals set
out in Part II of this paper. Since removal of the structural materials would
destroy the economic usefulness of the building, it should be prohibited. An-
other example would be the attempted removal of an elevator from a sky-
scraper. Such removal would shockingly diminish the economic value of the
remaining building for those having interests therein. In both cases, there-
fore, the fixture secured party should be denied his right to remove; instead,
he should be required to use judicial foreclosure proceedings. This will bring
into play the full equitable powers of the court for the purpose of preserving
the value of the real estate as an integrated economic unit and maximizing
the recovery for all parties having an interest in the real estate.70 Limiting
the right to remove in no way detracts from the fixture secured party's para-
mount security interest in his collateral. It merely requires him to enforce his
security interest in a sensible and equitable fashion.71
69. Gilmore, mupra note 10, at 1361, speculates that the vicissitudes of the New Jersey
courts in refusing to allow removal of needed apartment house fixtures was to avoid
having ". . . a substantial part of the population condemned to camping out on the New
Jersey marshes without heat, light, or refrigeration [thus] the courts ordered that the
essential equipment be left in the apartment houses."
70. As suggested in note 67 supra, this might be receivership in some cases. In other
cases, an appropriate sale of the land might be ordered.
Equity courts have in the past apparently been willing to take jurisdiction over a
whole asset to maximize recovery to individual interests therein. For example, see Na-
tional Park Bank v. Goddard, 131 N.Y. 494, 30 N.E. 566 (1892), involving the different
claims to individual components (linings, buttons, etc.) of completed garments. See also
Joralman v. McPhee, 31 Colo. 26, 71 P. 419 (1903), involving one set of liens on land
and another on the improvements thereto. The court sold the whole under a decree pro-
hibiting separate removal of the improvements.
71. If fixture security interests can and, in some circumstances, must be foreclosed
by judicial means, marshaling problems inevitably will arise. Section 9-313 can lead to
situations where there is one set of liens (security interests) on the fixture and another
set of liens on the total real estate. Yet, many judicial foreclosure proceedings will result
in a sale of the total real estate (fixture and building combined) and the realization of
only a single fund of money to be allocated between the two sets of liens. The question
of how this allocation should be made can raise difficulties.
Such problems, however, are not new to the courts; and solution can, probably be left
to their sound discretion. Similar situations have been so treated by the Code. See UCC
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B. The Exchange Problem: New Fixtures for Old
When an old fixture is exchanged for a new one, many real estate mort-
gagees are likely to feel that Section 9-313 deals with them most unfairly. To
illustrate the point, consider the case where an older furnace is removed and
replaced by a new furnace on which a paramount fixture security interest is
perfected. If the fixture secured party removes the furnace in order to col-
lect on his debt-as Section 9-313 now permits-then the real estate mort-
gagee is likely to feel that his security has been unfairly depleted. He is likely
to reason that he originally had a perfectly good mortgage on a building
which was made economically useable and valuable by an older yet workable
furnace. However, that furnace is now gone, having been removed to make
room for the new furnace. When the fixture secured party later removes the
new furnace as well, the building may be rendered virtually useless. Under
such conditions, the real estate mortgagee is likely to damn Section 9-313
and call for its repeal. 72 If Section 9-313 actually creates such conditions, one
could be quite sympathetic with the real estate mortgagee's despair. However,
it does not seem likely that the Commercial Code can be construed to be quite
such a villain.
The real estate mortgagee's apparent plight really involves the question of
waste. It raises the question of how the law should deal with a fixture secured
party who, in the process of installing his fixture, wrongfully damages or
wrongfully removes property subject to another person's security. Prior to
the Commercial Code, the few courts which dealt with this problem had little
trouble in reaching an equitable solution. 73 Usually the approach was to
weigh the increase in value of the building attributable to the addition of the
new fixture against the value of the older fixture which had been removed.
If the balance was in favor of the fixture claimant, priority to the new fixture
was usually awarded to him. 74 If the balance was in favor of the land mort-
§ 9-311 (Comment). On the other hand, some guide lines written into the official com-
ments accompanying § 9-313 might be helpful. Probably the fairest approach is to
order distribution of the fund according to a ratio which takes into consideration the
value added to the real estate by the fixture on the date of foreclosure compared to the
total value of the real estate. By way of example, assume a building valued at $90,000
without a particular fixture. With fixture installed, the value of the total real estate is
$100,000. Obviously, the value added by the fixture is $10,000, or 10% of the total. Upon
a judicial foreclosure sale, ninety percent of any fund realized would be distributed to
persons having claims against the total real estate; ten percent would be distributed to
persons having claims against the fixture. For a case following this approach, see Joral-
man v. McPhee, supra note 70, where the fund was allocated to land liens and to im-
provement liens according to their respective values.
72. The author's personal feeling is that this kind of thinking contributed more to
Ohio's repeal of § 9-313 than any other single factor.
73. See, e.g., Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N.J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (1888). See also
Annot., 13 A.L.R. 448, 468 (1921).
74. E.g., Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43 Del. (4 Terry) 322, 47
A.2d 164 (1941) ; Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Katz, 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 595 (1931).
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gagee's older fixture, the priority as to the new fixture usually went to him.75
In any case, damages for waste were always available to the aggrieved mort-
gagee.
76
The fact that Section 9-313 makes possible a top-priority fixture security
interest can hardly be read as a license for fixture secured parties to destroy
the property or security of others. Rather, it seems more likely that aggrieved
real estate mortgagees can still obtain appropriate relief against such wrong-
doing secured parties under Section 1-103, declaring general rules of law and
equity to be supplements to the Commercial Code. Nevertheless, the actual
language of Section 9-313 does not make this completely clear, and should,
therefore, be modified to allay the real estate mortgagee's fears that his secu-
rity may be unjustly imperiled. More specifically, clarifying amendments
should be added to state that Section 9-313 does not authorize a fixture
secured party to commit waste.77 Such amendments should also: (1) express-
ly empower a court where waste has been wrongfully committed to grant
appropriate equitable relief, including the power to subordinate a fixture secu-
rity interest in whole or in part where the circumstances so require and (2)
give discretion to a court to issue a money award against the wrongdoing
secured party in lieu of subordination. Moreover, any such money award should
be deemed an equitable order, punishable by contempt, and should be awarded




The Code's present triple financing system, which is dependent on the dis-
tinction between chattel, fixture and structural goods, has created much
confusion. The proposal for an integrated and unified purchase money col-
lateral financing system suggested in this paper is designed to end that con-
fusion by eliminating the need to draw the uncertain lines between chattel,
fixture and structural goods for financing purposes. To achieve this single
financing system, filing and priority rules for fixture and structural goods
security interests and the comparable rules for chattels should be made to
coincide. In particular, this goal can be achieved practicably for the filing rules
by requiring fixture and structural goods filings to be duplicated both in the
chattel and real estate records.
The priority rules can be unified by:
a. Requiring fixture and structural goods security interests to be filed
within ten days from the time the debtor receives possession in order to
75. E.g., Murray Co. v. Jacksboro Oil & Milling Co., 205 S.W. 517 (Tex. Civ.
Ap. 1918).
76. Holland Furnace Co. v. Bird, 45 Wyo. 471, 21 P.2d 825 (1933); Fisk v. Peoples
Nat'l Bank, 14 Colo. App. 21, 59 P. 63 (1899).
77. See appendix for proposed revision of § 9-313(6).
78. Ibid.
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obtain a supremacy over the land ihterests (whether arising prior to of 'sub-
sequent to the installation of the fixture) other than bona fide purchasers of
the land.
b. Giving to bona fide purchasers of the land priority over any fixture or
structural goods security interest which was not filed at the time of the pur-
chase.
c. Eliminating from the present chattel rules the requirement that a bona
fide purchaser must receive delivery of the chattel in order to defeat an un-
perfected purchase money security interest therein.
Certain misunderstandings respecting the present effect of Section 9-313 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, also need clarification. In particular, Section
9-313 should be amended to make it clear that the fixture secured party may
use judicial proceedings or removal for the purpose of foreclosing his secured
interest. In cases where removal of the fixture would affect health, welfare
and safety or in cases where removal would cause irreparable harm to other
interests in the land, then judicial foreclosure proceedings should be made
mandatory. Section 9-313 also should be clarified to state that a fixture secured
party is not authorized to commit waste or unlawfully to impair the security
of others.
APPENDix
PROPOSED REvIsIoN OF ARTICLE 9 OF U.C.C.
Changes or additions in the Commercial Code are indicated by italics, dele-
tions by strikeouts.
U.C.C. 9-301
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected secu-
rity interest is subordinate to the rights of
(a). (No Change).
(b). (No Change).
(c). in the case of goods, instruments, documents and chattel paper, a
person who is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk
or other buyer not in ordinary course of business to the extent that
he gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowl-





Priority of Security Interests in Goods Which Become Part
of Real Estate
1. The rules of this section apply to fixtures which term shall include:
(a) fixtures and (b) goods incorporated into a structure in the manner of
lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like. This Act does not
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prevent creation of an encumbrance' upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to
the law applicable to real estate.
2. A purchase money security interest in fixtures which is perfected before
or within ten days after the goods which are'or which are to become the fix-
tures come into the possession of the debtor takes priority as to the fixtures
over the claims of all persons who have or subsequently obtain an interest in
the real estate except a purchaser who within said ten day period acquires any
interest in the real estate to the extent that said purchaser gives value without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A 'creditor with
a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate who subsequently gives value
is a purchaser to the extent of the subsequent value extended.
3. A security interest in goods which are or are to become fixtures and
which is not entitled to the priority rule stated in subsection 2 is subordinate
to any person with an interest in the real estate at the time that the goods come
into the possession of the debtor. Such security interest is prior to all persons
acquiring interests in the real estate subsequent to the time that the goods
come into the possession of the debtor except
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate;
or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by
judicial proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to
the extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained,
or the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted
for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A
purchaser of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer
purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this
section.
4. When under subsections (2) and (3) and (4) a secured party has
priority over the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he
may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5 and subject to Subsection
5, remove his collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any en-
cumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not
otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any
diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods
removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to reim-
bursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives
adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
5. Notwithstanding Subsection 4, a court may in appropriate circumstances
prohibit a secured party having the right to remove his collateral from so do-
ing and may instead require the secured party to enfdrce his security interest
in the collateral by judicial procedures.
6. This section does not authorize a secured party unlawfully to commit
waste with respect to real estate or unlawfully to impair the security of others
1964]
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in the real estate. Where a secured party has unlawfully committed waste or
unlawfully impaired the security of another, then a court may
(a) Subordinate in whole or in part the security interest of the secured
party to the interest in the land of the aggrieved party, or
(b) order the secured party to pay damages to the aggrieved party. Such
order shall be issued only where collection thereof seems reasonably
assured. Until the order is fully complied with, the court shall retain
jurisdiction to issue other appropriate relief, or
(c) issue any other appropriate order.
U.C.C. 9-401
First Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as
follows:
(a) In addition to the filing required by paragraph (b), when the col-
lateral is goods which at the time the security interest attaches are
or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on
the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded;
(b) (No Change).
Second and Third Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as
follows:
(a) (No Change).
(b) in addition to the filing required by paragraphs (a) and (c), when
the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest attaches
are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on
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